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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to analyze the economic
effects of Federally mandated energy efficiency standards on
the market for home appliances. The analytical focal point of
this thesis centers on representative studies and
Congressional testimony supplemented by current articles and
data. The benefits and costs of energy efficiency standard
implementation are examined. Economic assumptions and key
determinant factors that drive results, such as discount rate
selection, provide the basis for objective comparison. The
findings of this study support the need for Federal
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This study will evaluate the economic effect of Federally
mandated energy efficiency standards for hot water heaters,
one of thirteen home appliances affected by the National
Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987. Economic studies
and models utilized in the development of the Act will be
instrumental to the analysis. While product decisions can be
traced to non-economic factors, such as technical feasibility
and politics, this study will focus on the economic factors
inherent in product design choice.
The National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987 was
a culmination of a lengthy legislative process influenced
throughout by government, industry, consumer, state and
environmental concerns. Key players included the Department
of Energy, State energy officials, appliance industry
representatives, state and local utility management,
environmental and consumer advocacy groups and research
institutes. All had a stake in passing the Act, which had a
direct effect on all aspects of the economic market for home
appliances.
With the passing of time, the effects of the 1987
mandatory government regulation on home appliances can be
explored. Enforcement of standards and the resulting
benefit/cost tradeoffs can also be examined. Moreover, the
economic effect of government intervention in a free market
can be evaluated.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What economic models were used to determine energy
efficiency standards for hot water heaters?
2. Was benefit-cost analysis utilized in setting




How are energy efficiency standards enforced?
4. What effects, if any, have energy efficiency
standards had on the hot water heater industry?
5. Should the government mandate energy efficiency
standards for hot water heaters?
C. METHODOLOGY
1. A review of ongoing research in the area of energy
efficiency standards focused on benefit-cost
analysis and comparability of assumptions utilized
in the studies.
2. A literature search included data available
through the • Energy Information Administration
(DOE) , appliance trade organizations and utility
management organizations as well as supporting
documentation from the National Appliance Energy
Conservation Act of 1987.
3. Personal interviews with key players in the
passage of the Act were conducted to supplement
existing literature sources. Additional
interviews with Department of Energy and home
appliance industry trade representatives provided




This study will focus on currently available data and
supplemental personal interviews to forward the economic study
of energy efficiency standards in the hot water heater market.
The intent of this study is to evaluate historical and current
data with the objective of providing a correlated framework to
better understand economic factors in governmental regulation
of free economic markets.
E. ORGANIZATION
This study will begin with an in depth look at the
background for government mandated energy efficiency standards
for home appliances. From 1982 until passage of the Act in
1987, testimony of Congressional hearings and media coverage
of the issue provided an interesting and comprehensive outline
of the forces and influences involved. Next, the economic
models utilized in standard development are evaluated. This
is followed by an assessment of the impact that standards had
on the market for home appliances, using water heaters as a
representative of the 13 appliances affected by
standardization. A look at enforcement and certification
procedures and their costs will follow. Finally, conclusions
and recommendations will be offered highlighting the need to
assess all of the benefits and costs of governmental
regulation or standardization before implementation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Federal regulation via standardization in the hot water
heater market seeks to address the issue of energy efficiency
and conservation. By mandating standards, the government
assumes that both the market and the consumer will not make
economically efficient decisions in the production and
purchasing of hot water heaters. To ensure efficient usage of
scarce resources, the government invokes standards.
Those who advocate government regulation suggest that
mandatory standards allow a more consistent national policy.
Another argument for regulation is that it is a better
alternative than government assumption of private production
functions.
The opposing view is that regulation of free markets does
not allow the forces of supply and demand to work. This view
also suggests that public processes are inherently inefficient
and that regulation itself results in inefficiency. Private
industry has the capability to gain real-time information
quicker and therefore respond sooner then public or
governmental agencies. Another argument against regulation of
free markets is that the gains possible are small compared to
the inefficiencies that may result. [Ref. l:pp. 190-191]
B. EXPECTED MARKET OUTCOME
An efficient market should allow consumers to make
informed purchase decisions based on tradeoffs between
performance attributes and life cycle costs. In the case of
water heaters, performance attributes are synonymous with
energy efficiency improvements, such as heat pumps, better
insulation and timers that conserve power during periods of
non-use. Life cycle costs would reflect operating costs over
the life of the equipment. Ideally, the consumer would expect
a balance between higher performance attributes and lower life
cycle costs and vice versa. Purchase cost can be a factor in
the purchase decision but should be secondary to life cycle
costs. This depends on consumer satisfaction and awareness of
the pay back period or time required for operating savings to
recover purchase costs.
In the home appliance market, and more specifically the
market for hot water heaters, the expected market outcome is
dependant on consumer type. The three consumer categories are
first time buyers, retrofit or replacement buyers and third
party buyers (builders or contractors) . Studies suggest that
in purchase decisions for some consumer categories, purchase
costs override life cycle costs and performance attributes as
the dominant factor in the purchase decision.
Third party consumers, such as builders and contractors,
account for almost 80% of the market for home appliances. A
1980 Builders Home Survey revealed that builders and
contractors focus on purchase cost as their main determinant
in purchase decisions involving home appliances. [Ref.
2 : Abstract]
Analysis of the resulting 406 questionnaires indicated
that builders were primarily responsible for brand
selection. These choices were made primarily without
regard for energy efficiency of the product. A similar
apparent lack of consideration of energy efficiency
during brand and model selection was found among home-
buyers and specialized subcontractors.
The builder or contractor's main concern is purchase cost.
This effects their profit margin, while life cycle costs do
not. Life cycle costs are passed on to the eventual owner of
the property. It does not make good business sense for
builders and contractors to independently incur unrecoverable
costs that make them less competitive in comparison to other
builders. Even the Federal government is a third party
consumer. Federal housing projects typically employ the same
philosophy as builders, looking at purchase cost as the main
factor in purchase decisions. This is ironic in that the
Federal Government has long term considerations, as both a
landlord and bill payer. This warrants examining the
tradeoffs between performance attributes and life cycle costs
to reduce costs in the long run. One possible explanation is
that annual budget constraints focus management on purchase
cost instead of life cycle costs.
A Government Accounting Office Report, dated September 16,
1981, highlighted the Federal Housing problem. [Ref. 3:pg.
135]
Normal market forces, in themselves, do not encourage
the installation of the most energy efficient and cost
effective equipment. The developer of such housing,
rather than the ultimate homeowner, normally selects
the heating and cooling equipment installed.
Developers are primarily concerned with installing
equipment that adequately performs the function at the
least cost.
Low income consumers are also particularly sensitive to
purchase cost. In spite of the Federal Trade Commission's
extensive efforts since 1975 to emphasize estimated life cycle
operating costs, low income consumers consistently react to
purchase cost as their main consideration. The FTC's Energy
Guide program provides them with critical data for cost and
energy efficiency comparisons, but initial outlays continue to
be the dominant decision factor. [Ref. 4:pg. 27]
Manufacturers are sensitive to the third party consumer and
low income consumer. In absence of regulation, they would
continue to provide low efficiency and low cost products for
this significant market share.
Conversely, retrofit and other first time consumers appear
to react positively to the estimated savings in operating
costs and purchase more energy efficient water heaters. These
consumers realize that the benefits outweigh the up-front
costs of performance attributes and act in their best interest
to reduce future and overall costs.
The assumption that higher energy efficiency leads to
proportionately higher energy savings can be in error. Lower
consumer energy costs that are caused by higher efficiency
appliances can cause consumers to use more energy. For
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example, a consumer has a new energy efficient heater
installed. Assuming monthly energy bills are reduced, the
consumer has more discretionary income. The consumer decides
to then increase the temperature setting in the house to have
greater comfort, with his/her bill approximating the normal
cost of the old system. This is an illustrative application
of the economic theory known as the substitution effect, with
a supporting income effect. [Ref. 5:pg. 94] A recent study,
by Hurst and White, highlights this consumer behavior and
outlines the difficulty of correlating economic savings from
energy efficiency to consumer behavior. [Ref. 6:pg. 31]
Conclusions from the study revealed that, on average, actual
energy savings are less than predicted from engineering
estimates associated with energy efficiency audits. Further,
there was a significant variation in actual energy savings
between households and the relationship between predicted
actual savings.
The battle between free market forces and national
standard advocates centers on whether the consumer will freely
make energy efficient choices or require the government to
shape his choices to energy efficient products via standards,
taxes or incentive programs.
In view of the complex relationships between
consumer/market behavior and product energy efficiency, it is
necessary to examine the underlying reasoning for
implementation of Federal energy efficiency standards. A
8
closer look at the legislative history of energy efficiency
standards is necessary to provide the background for
subsequent discussion.
C. HISTORY OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY STANDARDS
To understand the development of the National Appliance
Energy Conservation Act of 1987, it is necessary to highlight
the chronological steps of the legislative and executive
process which shaped the Act. The issues and theories
forwarded by industry, government and environmental concerns
provide an understanding as to the forces and influences
involved in the regulation of private industry by the federal
government
.
1975 Congress passes the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
Act, which requires home appliances to have energy
efficiency rating labels affixed to appliances for consumer
benefit.
1976 California passes a tough comprehensive law requiring
energy efficiency standards for all home appliance sold in
the state. Other states begin developing varying standards
for home appliances.
1978 Congress orders the Department of Energy to set
efficiency levels for 13 home appliances. Provisions for
this action were outlined in the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975.
1981 DOE blocks standards by issuing a "no standards"
standard. (Standard is that no standard is required.) The
National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) files suit in a
Washington D.C. court to overturn this standard. (NRDC
eventually wins the case.)
1981- 1986 Hearings convene before both the House and Senate
Energy Committees. Witnesses testify representing a wide
range of views on the issue of Federal energy efficiency
standards. Witnesses can be categorized into five separate
groups; Government, industry, state, utility, and
environmentalist/consumer advocate. A summary of each
group's position on Federal regulation of the energy
efficiency of home appliances follows.
1. Government View
Top Department of Energy officials pursued a unified
approach throughout the legislative process. They
consistently resisted efforts by industry, utility and
environmentalist/consumer advocate groups to force them to
develop and administer a national standardization program for
home appliances. The government position was consistent with
the political and economical ideology of the Reagan
administration, which generally advocated allowing free market
forces to determine market equilibrium without government
regulation. When forced by law (1975 ECPA) to develop
standards, the Department of Energy adopted a "no standard"
standard which complied with the law but did not make the
government the regulator of the home appliance market. The
government's position was based on the assumption that the
costs of standard development and administration were too high
when existing market forces were working.
The Government Accounting Office conducted a study of
the "no standard" standard development and justification
process in 1982. [Ref. 4: pp. i-ii] The report concluded that
basic assumptions in the Department of Energy's analysis were
flawed. Specifically, they faulted the assumption that
consumers purchase higher efficiency appliances in the face of
rising energy costs.
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The analyses contain an unvalidated key assumption, are
inconsistent in their treatment of the effects of
market forces, and use high energy price projections.
The potential impact of this decrease is to decrease
the energy savings from, and increase the costs of,
appl iance standards
.
Water heaters were cited as an example of the lack of
a strong relationship between the price of energy and energy
efficiency. For the period 1972 thru 1978, the price of gas
increased 65% while the energy efficiency rating of water
heaters went up by only 1.7%. [Ref. 7:pg. 153]
By issuing the "no standards" standard, the Federal
Government preempted State energy efficiency regulation.
Congressional hearings now reflected growing support for
Federal regulation among a diverse coalition of industry,
environmentalist/consumer advocate and utility groups, forcing
the government to rethink its position. The government
reluctantly began to evaluate standardization programs again.
However, the Department of Energy was still resisting the role
of national regulator of energy efficiency in home appliances
as late as 1986. Further reasons for objecting to Federal
regulation arose because of the difficulty of setting
standards for multiple climate zones, foreign competition
issues, possible impacts on product design, reduction in
product lines/employment and increased purchase cost to
consumers
.
Congressional support continued to grow, in spite of
DOE's view, providing the impetus for overriding Reagan's
11
pocket veto of the 198 6 National Appliance Energy Conservation
Act and eventually contributing to the bill's passage in 1987.
2 . Industry View
Home appliance industry representatives started out
resisting all regulation as a needless intrusion by regulatory
agencies into a market that they felt efficiently responded to
consumer demand. Arguments centered on the premise that
consumers made informed and efficient choices on energy
issues. An example of this was a statement made by Robert M.
Gants, a Vice President of the Association of Home Appliance
Improvement. In a March 18, 1986 article published in the
Christian Science Monitor, he stated that "the home appliance
market had become 4 to 7 percent more efficient in response
to competitive free market forces and thus did not need
regulation". [Ref. 8:pg. 6]
This resistance to regulation eroded quickly in view
of State development and implementation of varied energy
efficiency standards. Faced with an increasingly complex and
costly problem of complying with different standards in
different States, the industry realized its only feasible
choice was to support Federal efficiency standards. The
testimony of David A. Corcoran, President of American Supply
Association, highlights some of the problems appliance
industry companies faced. [Ref. 9:pg. 218-219]
Massachusetts has a standard for hot water heaters.
The only heaters that are sold are those that meet or
exceed the standard. I cannot sell water heaters in
the adjacent State of Rhode Island, a State without a
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standard. In order to do so, I would have to stock
multiple inventories to meet the demand in both States.
Multiple inventories increase my cost to the point
where I cannot justify the additional overhead. Product
costs are increased because of increased handling and
inventory expense, costs which have no bearing on the
energy efficiency of the product.
Practical issues of efficiency of production, design,
inventory and cost factors drove the industry to conclude that
Federal standards were better than multiple State standards.
Other costs of complying with multiple State standards
were raised by Robert B. Gilbert, representing the Air-
Conditioning Refrigeration Institute. [Ref.lO:pg 69]
Our industry needs national economies of scale in order
to produce the most efficient product at the lowest
cost to the consumer. When the national market is
chopped into small pieces, the whole process becomes
chaotic, terribly expensive, inefficient and very
risky. More frequent model changes will mean more
frequent redesign, retooling and shorter production
runs. The result will be higher costs and eventually
higher prices for the consumer, perhaps 10 to 20
percent per unit. The result probably also will be the
inability of some companies to maintain a foothold in
the market and survive. In short, if we are going to
be regulated, and we are being regulated today in more
and more States, then the only way to go is Federal
regulation.
Home appliance industry advocates found themselves
aligned with a diverse coalition of environmentalist/consumer
advocate and utility groups seeking the same goal. The
strength of this coalition had a positive effect on Congress




State officials and lobbyists for State Government
Associations worked hard in opposition to Federal energy
efficiency standards. Federal standards, if passed, would
supersede State regulations, removing regulatory and
legislative power from State governments. New York and
California led the nation in energy efficiency programs. Both
had large energy conservation staffs and extensive resources
involved in development of energy efficiency standards. They
considered their energy programs an important contributor to
national energy conservation. With high State populations and
high energy demand, these States felt that they were best
qualified to manage energy programs at the State level. Other
States modeled their energy programs after these with
modifications based on climate and population considerations.
Most States adhered closely to the American Society of
Heating, Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE)
Standards which were generally accepted across the nation as
the minimum standard for being considered energy efficient.
Proponents of State regulation were strongly opposed
to the Department of Energy's issuance of the "no standard"
standard, which in effect preempted existing State efficiency
standards. The multiple State standards caused industry,
environmentalist, consumer and utility groups to band together
and help influence passage of Federal Standards in spite of
State objections.
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4. Environmentalist/Consumer Advocate View
Throughout the legislative process, environmentalist
and consumer advocate groups supported the need for national
standards for efficiency in home appliances. As many as 41
different organizations were members of the Coalition for
Federal Appliance Efficiency Standards. The Audubon Society,
Sierra Club, Consumers Union and National Consumers League
were among these. The major proponent of the environmentalist
and consumer viewpoint was the Natural Resources Defense
Council. David B. Goldstein, a Senior Staff Scientist with
the Natural Resources Defense Council, testified before
Congress as to the environmental impacts that result from
national standards. [Ref. llrpg. 3]
Reductions in energy use can lead to substantial
reductions in air pollution. For example, the
California Energy Commission calculated that its
refrigerator standards would reduce emissions of
nitrogen oxides by 5% statewide and emissions of sulfur
oxides by 20%. These two pollutants are major
precursors to acid rain.
In the area of consumer benefits, research by the
American Council for An Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE)
showed that the standards proposed in the 1987 National
Appliance Energy Conservation Act could save 22,000 megawatts
of peak electric power by the year 2000. [Ref. 11: pg. 11]
The ACEEE study shows a savings to consumers of over
$28 billion nationwide, or a cost reduction of over
$250 for an average American family. Money saved by
consumers on their energy bills will be spent on other
activities, fostering job creation and economic growth.
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The environmental and consumer groups were
instrumental in rallying support for national standards.
Their arguments centered on savings and cost avoidance with a
general rationalization that national standards were a win-win
solution for all.
5. Utility View
Groups representing utility views, such as the
American Public Power Association and the Edison Electric
Institute, strongly supported national energy efficiency
standards. With national standards, more uniform products
would allow better estimates of future energy demand.
Considering the capital investment decisions and dollars
involved, any reduction in energy demand could defer expensive
utility plant expansion. A 1986 study conducted by Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory concluded that standard implementation in
Nevada could reduce the need for new power plants by 30 to 60
percent. [Ref. 12:pp. 147-160] This is significant in that
erroneous energy demand forecasting has cost the national
utility industry an estimated $20 billion in wasted
investment, according to DOE analysis. [Ref. ll:pg. 123]
Utility proponents also had a significant interest in
national standards from another perspective. Seeking to
influence consumer behavior, utilities had developed consumer
rebate programs rewarding efficient appliance purchasers with
discounts on their monthly bills. [Ref. 13:pg. 2]
Rebates have been extremely successful and cost
effective way for utilities to "purchase" additional
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capacity on the demand side, but they are insufficient
by themselves. For one thing, rebates tend to go to
middle and upper income consumers, with lower income
families often limited to used appliances or rental
housing, in which appliance costs emphasize first costs
rather than life cycle costs.
According to Larry Hobart, Executive Director for the
American Public Power Association," national standards would
be a more efficient and equitable method of achieving energy
conservation then the rebate." [Ref. 13:pg. 2]
Utility industry leaders joined with environmental,
consumer, and appliance industry advocates to help pass the
1987 National Appliance Energy Conservation Act.
Reaction
Media interest in the 1987 National Appliance Energy
Conservation Act focused on estimated energy savings that
would result from the bill. While savings varied depending on
the source, it is interesting to note the lack of any coverage
of the estimated cost to develop, administer or enforce the
national standards.
The most critical view of the bill was forwarded by
Doug Bandow, a Senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He
sighted three effects that would result from passage of the
bill. [Ref. 14:pg. A-5] First, energy guide labels allow
consumers to be informed and make choices. Standards would
restrict choices, notably on the lower end of the energy
efficiency and cost scale. Costs would increase and unduly
effect low income consumers, who value low purchase cost
rather than operating life cycle costs as their main buying
17
concern. Secondly, he refuted the utility industry argument
that energy efficiency reduction in home appliances reduces
energy usage. An increase in prices commensurate with low
efficiency model discontinuation and built-in energy saving
features would force consumers to hold on to older more in-
efficient appliances. Also, if consumers purchase energy
efficient models they would be more likely to purchase
additional units since their energy bill would be lower.
Finally, he recognized legitimate arguments for resolution of
varied State standards but suggested federal standards are not
the solution. He suggested that eliminating barriers to
interstate trade would solve the problem.
The bottom line is that energy efficiency does not
necessarily equate to cost efficiency. He supports a free
market where consumers can make informed decisions.
D. SUMMARY
Over the period from 1975 to 1987, the United States
government, State officials, utility management, lobbyists,
and industry representatives waged legislative battles over
the adoption of national energy efficiency standards for home
appliances. The government began the struggle under the
influence of "Reaganomics" and sought a hands off approach to
economic markets. Testimony of Department of Energy Officials
was consistent with this philosophy. State energy officials
saw Federal standards as usurping their right to regulate
within state boundaries. Trade industry representatives at
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first resisted support for Federal standards as restrictive of
free market economic forces. The complexity of dealing with
many different State standards led them to support Federal
regulation as the lesser of two evils. Faced with unified
support for Federal energy standards by environmental,
consumer, industry and utility groups, the government
reluctantly acquiesced.
Analysis of the positions adopted by the opposing sides in
the struggle over national standards revealed a inconsistent
approach in justifying or opposing standards. Savings
dominated almost all aspects of proponent arguments and costs
dominated opposing evaluations. In light of this, it is only
fair to balance the benefits with the costs. Between the
years 1979 and 1981, DOE spent over $15 million on standard
development and testing. [Ref. 15:pg. 45] Harder to quantify
is the cost effect on industry. Retooling, product
discontinuation and redesign, unemployment, and other costs to
the appliance industry should also be weighed.
Chapter III will provide a closer examination of the
studies and models influential in the development of energy
efficiency standards for home appliances.
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III. MODELS AND STUDIES ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
What studies or models were influential in the legislative
process that resulted in the 1987 National Appliance Energy
Conservation Act? What assumptions were made about the market
for home appliances and more specifically hot water heaters.
To answer these questions several of the available studies are
examined, concentrating on their assumptions, data, and
estimates for cost and savings. While other studies or models
exist, this thesis will utilize several representative
studies/models as a framework to analyze the economic
strengths and weaknesses of their approaches. In particular,
The Department of Energy's 1982 Engineering Analysis Document
provides an breakdown of estimated costs to the home appliance
industry that could be attributed to standard implementation.
The National Audubon Society Model State Energy Efficiency
Bill and an American Council For An Energy-Efficient Economy
Study examine estimated savings predicted under varying
assumptions. These studies and others, along with the
testimony of interested parties, contributed to the passage of
the 1987 National Appliance Energy Conservation Act.
20
B . COMPONENTS
Program or project evaluation can take many forms.
Internal Rate of Return, Payback, Benefit-Cost Analysis and
Net Present Value Analysis are all methods that assist
managers in the economic decision making process. Which
method you prefer could be based on available data or
assumptions you use. While these methods can help decision
makers compare alternate projects, they also provide an
excellent means for evaluating a new project against a
baseline or status quo.
According to Ruegg and Petersen, selecting a method of
economic evaluation is but one step in a ten step process.
[Ref. 16:pg. 6]
1) Define the problem and state the objective
2) Identify constraints
3) Identify technically sound technologies
4) Choose method (s) of evaluation
5) Compile data and establish assumptions
6) Calculate measures of economic performance
7) Compare alternatives
8) Perform sensitivity analysis
9) Take into account unquantified effects
10) Make recommendations
While a comprehensive economic evaluation process should
include all these areas, this study will examine two critical
areas that influenced representative study outcomes - Step (4)
Choose method (s) of evaluation and Step (5) Compile data and
establish assumptions. These two areas provide a good
comparison point between the different studies and allow




Many energy efficiency studies use the payback method as
the preferred economic analysis method. This parallels
business preferences to utilize the payback method. Over 70%
of the businesses in the world use payback as their economic
analysis tool. [Ref. 17:pg. 135]
The payback method usually takes one of two forms - simple
payback or discounted payback. The major difference between
the two is that the discounted payback method takes into
account the time value of money.
The payback method appears to provide a good indicator of
recovery of consumer first costs measured against equipment
life. However, problems arise in expanding the payback
evaluation to a national scale. If simple payback is used it
will provide a quicker payback period then a more realistic
discounted payback method. Also, the payback method does not
deal with operational costs or savings after payback is
realized.
It could be argued that a more appropriate economic
evaluation method for a national economic issue is benefit-
cost analysis. Whereas, the payback method would provide an
indication of when investment costs where recovered, the
benefit-cost analysis method should provide a total balance of
all costs and benefits associated with a program or project.
Another reason to choose the benefit-cost method involves
consumer behavior. Assuming consumer behavior is uncertain,
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with regard to energy efficiency optimization, the payback
method does not provide a quantifiable evaluation point to
assess the feasibility of whether or not standards should be
implementated
.
For example, in determining what the energy efficiency
level should be, does a payback period of two years effect
consumer choice? Is there a positive correlation between
payback period and energy efficiency? In the home appliance
market, market failures such as information failure, third
party consumer purchasers and consumer welfare loss tend to
prevent consumers from optimizing payback data.
With benefit-cost analysis, estimated costs can be weighed
against estimated benefits to arrive at an analytical
conclusion. However, care must be exercised in utilizing the
benefit-cost economic evaluation. In setting efficiency
standards, the point where marginal benefits just exceed
marginal costs would define minimum standard levels. This
point would be hard to identify but would approximate the
least cost for the most benefit. This would address the issue
of whether the government has set the standard too strictly or
too loosely. Of course this argument is independent of
political and technological issues, which would effect the
objective balancing of costs and benefits. This is the case
with home appliances as State and Congressional objectives
influence the process determining energy efficiency standards.
States want to maintain certain levels of energy efficiency
23
standards and Congress wants to maximize dollar and energy
savings.
Common to the different approaches in economic analysis is
the balancing of all estimated or actual costs against
estimated savings or resultant benefits. It is essential that
assumptions made about costs and benefits be fair. Ideally,
political and issue oriented overtones should be removed from
the economic spectrum allowing an unbiased assessment of the
benefits and costs of a proposed project or program.
D. DIFFERENCES
The apparent intent of each of the studies/models is to
provide support or argue the case for a specific position or
view. Whether you support or oppose implementation of Federal
energy efficiency standards, the range of possible assumptions
allows some latitude in your approach.
For example, if the discount rate used to adjust future
costs and benefits varies significantly between studies, than
the conclusions drawn from the resultant data could be
markedly different. If one analysis used a 0% discount rate
while another used 5%, the former project would appear to
provide greater savings than the latter. [Ref.l8:pg 691]
Often there are few or no benefits in the early years,
but benefits increase as the project is brought into
full development. Thus the effects of discounting the
costs will not be as great as the discounting of
benefits, because the costs tend to occur early.
Consequently, any group or organization with a real
stake in promoting a project will want to use a low
discount rate.
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In examining the following models and studies, varied
assumptions, such as discount rate selection and treatment of
cost and benefit data, will be analyzed with the goal of
providing an objective look at the data presented. Only by
examining the total spectrum of costs and savings can one net
the true potential of a program or project.
E. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY STUDY
The Consumer Products Efficiency Standards Engineering
Analysis Document was the only study to attempt to guantify
the home appliance industry costs associated with implementing
the energy efficiency standard. While standard proponents and
the Government Accounting Office found fault with DOE ' s
assumptions about free market efficiency [Ref. 4:pp. i-ii],
it remains a source of important cost data essential to
evaluating the costs of standards on the home appliance
industry.
The study was completed by Arthur D. Little Inc., under
contract to DOE, and focused on cost-efficiency relationships
based on four general areas: [Ref. 19:pg. C-l]
1) Total industry-wide investment required to meet
various efficiency levels by product type.
2) Materials required to meet various efficiency levels
by product class.
3) Average per unit cost change necessary to meet
specified energy levels by product class.
4) The relationship between price and efficiency level
by product class.
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3) Retooled jacket top
4) Heat traps
These improvements were to be incorporated from a baseline
product efficiency level, based on data from lab tests,
manufacturers and the State of California's list of certified
water heaters. [Ref. 19:pg. D3-8]
Efficiency was measured in two ways - recovery efficiency
and standby loss. First, recovery efficiency was calculated
by dividing the ratio of useful energy output by the energy
utilized in increasing the water temperature from 7 degrees
to 160 degrees F. Residential water heaters are normally set
at temperatures lower than 160 degrees. Water must travel
varying distances thru pipe to reach the user. This creates
a need for different peak heating levels. The key measurement
therefore is the energy required to heat the differential of
9 degrees.
Secondly, standby loss was calculated. Standby loss is
the amount of energy required to maintain 160 degrees F as a
percent of the capacity of the tank per hour. These two
inputs were used in calculating the energy required to heat
the assumed national daily household average of 64.3 gallons
of water. The result was called the Energy Factor (EF) . [Ref.
19:pg. D3-1]
The energy factor is the ratio of the useful output of
the water heater expressed as the energy required to
provide 64.3 gallons of water on a daily basis through
a 90 degree differential, divided by the estimated
daily energy consumption of the water heater calculated
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from the recovery efficiency and standby losses as
described above.
Complicating factors that required the narrow definition
of the energy factor were varying tank sizes and different
insulation materials. The purpose of utilizing the energy
factor appeared to be providing a fair analysis of heater
energy efficiency across product lines. Manufacturers
appeared to agree, as evidenced by the lack of significant
protest to energy factor levels proposed by this Engineering
Analysis.
To analyze manufacturer's costs associated with standard
implementation, six levels of efficiency were correlated to
related energy factors (EF) . The higher the efficiency level










5 60. 7# 91. 6@
6 92.1+
Notes * Level 2 with heat trap
# Level 3 with heat trap
@ Level 3 with heat trap
+ Level 4 with heat trap
Of note, the actual energy factors set by the 1987
National Appliance Energy Conservation Act were higher than
these. Gas heaters were to achieve a 62 (EF) as compared to
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the highest level in the study of 60.7 (EF) . Electric heaters
were to achieve 95 (EF) as compared to 92.1 (EF) . [Ref.20:pg
30]
Redesign, retooling, plant expansion and other additional
manufacturing costs were estimated based on an industry
structure of three larger and five medium firms. This assumed
















Medium Manufacturer 5 196, 000 1 205,500
Small manufacturers, defined as firms having sales below
one percent of the market, were not included. No general
manufacturing approach could be identified for these firms
because of the wide variability in their approach to
manufacturing. [Ref. 19:pg. A-2]
For evaluation purposes, all costs were collected into
four categories - investment, materials, labor and purchased
components.
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1) Investment-required investment in capital equipment,
tooling, plant and service/parts/
engineering/literature/inventory in thousands of
dollars per manufacturer necessitated by increasing
efficiency levels.
2) Materials-required changes in weight in the various
materials from which components of the product are
or were made expressed in pounds.
3) Labor-labor changes in minutes per appliance
necessitated by efficiency level increases.
4) Purchased Parts-changes in purchased parts in
dollars per appliance necessitated by efficiency
level increases. Certification and enforcement costs
(dollars) have been shown on a per unit basis as a
purchased part using DOE estimates.
Table III shows the Summary costs per unit associated with
standard implementation. [Ref. 19:pg. D3-23]
TABLE III
PRODUCT TYPE 3: WATER HEATERS
SUMMARY COST PER UNIT
L
GAS ELECTRIC GAS ELECTRIC
1.82 1.82 1.09 1.09 2.19 2.19 1.82 1.82
M 2.94 3.16 2.19 2.42 4.07 4.33 6.75 7.23
P
.11 .11 .11 .11 5.11 5.11 .11 .11
I
1 .05 .12 .06 .13 4 .19 .27 .23 .33
T 4.91 5.21 3.45 3.76 11.55 11.90 8.92 9.49
F
L
6.73 7.14 4.73 6.15 15.62 16.30 12.22 13.00
1.82 1.82 1.82 1.82 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19
H 4.07 4.33 4.41 4.75 6.16 6.54 5.56 5.97
P 2 .11 .11 .11 .11 5 5.11 5.11 5.11 5.11
I
.18 .25 .19 .19 .19 .26 .23 .31
T 6.18 6.52 6.53 6.87 13.65 14.12 13.08 13.58
F
L
.47 8.93 8.94 9.42 18.70 19.35 17.93 18.60
1.82 1.82 1.82 1.82 2.19 2.19
M 6.16 6.54 5.56 5.97 6.75 7.23
P 3 .11 .11 .11 .11 6 5.11 5.11
I
.19 .27 .23 .31 .23 .33
T 8.26 8.74 7.72 8.21 14.28 14.85
F 11.35 11.97 10.56 11.25 19.57 20.34
KEY: NOTE:
L = Labor; M = Materia Is; Data for large manufacturer
P = Purchased Parts; is in the left column of each
I = Investment; T = To tal block and for medium manufacturer
F = Ex-factory Cost (F = 1.37T) in the right.
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Imbedded in the cost figures is an .11 cents per unit DOE
estimate of certification and enforcement program costs that
would be assessed to manufacturers.
Utilizing the data in Table III, a rough dollar estimate
of additional costs to the manufacturer can be calculated.
These costs are the investment, material, labor and purchased
part costs that manufacturers would incur with the adoption of
energy efficiency standards. In the case of gas water
heaters, the estimated added cost to the manufacturer is just
under $56 million. This is based on efficiency level five
cost data multiplied by the assumed industry production volume
figures from Table I. For electric water heaters, the added
cost to manufacturers is just under $54 million, based on
efficiency level six cost data multiplied by the assumed
industry production volume figures in Table I. These amounts
are significant in themselves for they are but one of 13
appliances that were affected by Federal energy efficiency
standards.
An argument could be made that manufacturers would have
incurred these costs anyway in complying with proposed State
regulation that was being drafted at the time, thus making an
assessment of manufacturer's costs a moot point. This
argument does not adequately address the scope of the problem
or provide all the data for a fair and objective decision to
be rendered.
31
For example, if a town wanted to build a park and had
several alternatives with different costs and options, the
city planners and taxpayers would want all available data
concerning costs and potential benefits to be analyzed before
making a decision. Even if the one alternative was the
obvious choice, in fairness to all views, economic evaluation
based on all estimated costs and benefits would be a logical
and defendable position.
Table IV shows the incremental changes in efficiency,
price and estimated energy usage inherent with the design
options. [Ref. 19:pg. D3-24]
The projected energy savings was a straight line
calculation based on the annual energy demand. For electric
water heaters, savings was calculated by dividing 510,730
(kwh) by the (EF) . Gas heaters used 1740 (10 to the 6th power
BTU) divided by (EF) . [Ref. 19:pg. D3-1] The data suggests
a linear linkage between efficiency levels and reduced energy
demand. This may not be the case, as consumers may choose to
use more energy with newer more efficient products. This
substitution effect and a discussion of consumer behavior is
analyzed in Chapter II. The Consumer Products Efficiency
Standards Engineering Analysis Document appears to provide a
good estimate of manufacturing costs inherent to energy
efficiency standard implementation. What it does not address
are the operational and maintenance costs associated with the
different efficiency level products. This data would be
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TABLE IV
PRODUCT TYPE 3: WATER HEATERS
DESIGN OPTIONS/ENERGY FACTOR/YEARLY ENERGY CONSUMPTION
PRODUCT CLASS
GAS ELECTRIC
40.0 40.0 52.0 52.0
Baseline 203.0 203.0 164.0 164.0
Unit 47.9 47.9 78.3 78.3
36.3 36.3 6522.7 6522.7
125.0 125.0 13.0 13.0
E 1 213.8 214.4 171.6 172.2




30.1 30.1 6109.2 6109.2 Design Options:
1) Improved Insulation125.0 125.0 1.0 1.0
I 2 216.5 217.3 178.3 179.1 a) Increase Thickness
E 58.4 58.4 87.1 87.1 b) Foam Insulation
N 29.8 29.8 5863.7 5863.7
C 2) Increase Flow Heat
Y 125.0 125.0 1.0 1.0 Transfer and Reduce
3 221.2 222.2 180.9 182.0




29.5 29.5 5823.6 5823.6 3) Top retooled to Reduce
Mounting Lose1245.0 1245.0 1.0 1.0
E 4 228.3 229.1 183.5 184.8 4) Heat Trape
L 60.1 60.1 88.2 88.2
29.0 29.0 5790.6 5790.6 5) Reduce Pilot Rate
1245.0 1245.0 14.0 14.0
5 232.9 234.0 192.7 193.8
60.7 60.7 91.6 91.6









YEARLY ENERGY CONSUMPTION (KWH OR
MILLION STU)
MOTE: Data for large
manufacturers is in
the left column of




important to determining the total costs attributable to
standardization.
F. NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY MODEL BILL
In an effort to spur State adaptation of energy efficiency
standards, the National Audubon Society developed a model
bill. The National Audubon Society had an interest in
environmental issues that focused on power plant construction,
energy exploration, development and conservation. In their
view, energy efficiency standards would reduce the estimated
need for these.
Other benefits would also result from support for
standards. [Ref. 21:pg. 188]
Efficient appliances mean that less air pollution will
be released from home furnaces, less acid rain will be
generated by electric utilities, and less nuclear waste
will be produced that some day may escape into the
environment.
When the push for Federal standards began, the Audubon
Society supported it fully using their State Model Bill as a
reference. They utilized a computer model to generate savings
figures resultant from standards. Savings of 4 to 8 large
1000 megawatt power plants would be saved from construction.
Consumer savings of 13 to 26 billion dollars were also
estimated to occur through the passage of energy efficiency
standards. [Ref. 21:pg. 191] Their logic was that consumers,
the environment, the utilities, and the manufacturers would
all benefit from standards.
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The following assumptions were used in the computer model:
1) A zero discount rate was used to adjust future savings.
2) Savings projections were calculated through 2005.
3) Annual average power, not peak, were used in the
calculations.
Assumptions 1 and 2 tend to increase the possible savings
relative to other comparative studies, such as Geller [Ref.
22:pg. 10]. First, the zero discount rate is biased. It
emphasizes the highest possible savings figures, as discussed
earlier in this chapter. Second, with a longer period of
time, the Audubon model would show greater overall savings
then other studies. The length of the study could be
questioned from a viewpoint of how predictable energy prices
would be for so far into the future. The third assumption
assumes that power plants saved are operating at 60% capacity.
[Ref. 21:pg. 193]
The Audubon computer model does not distinguish between
peak and average power. Consequently we have assumed
that the annual electricity savings are spread out
uniformly over the year deriving an estimate of the
number of power plant equivalents that will be
eliminated by the proposed standards. In fact the
savings from S. 2781 (Standards) would come in the form
of peaking plants rather than base load plants.
This assumption does not address the question of whether
standard implementation will permanently eliminate the need
for the power plants or just help delay their need. Given
that they will be eventually needed, the cost avoidance or
savings attributed to not building them cannot be accredited
to energy efficiency standard implementation alone. It would
35
apply if one discounted the future savings to calculate the
present value.
The National Audubon Society Model identifies savings. It
appears designed, by the assumptions chosen, to make a case
for standards as a way to avoid power plant construction,
environmental exploitation, development and use. It does not
appear to provide objectivity in a balanced approach to
analyzing costs and benefits.
G. AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECONOMY STUDY
The American Council For An Energy Efficient Economy
(ACEEE) is a non-profit organization that supports energy
conservation. Howard S. Geller, a Research Associate for the
group, provided a comprehensive study of energy efficiency
savings possible through adoption of Federal standards.
Beginning in 1983, Geller analyzed benefits and costs
associated with efficiency standards. His ACEEE sponsored
study utilized DOE costing data. Because of this, energy
saving design options, such as heat pumps, were not used. The
importance of new efficiency equipment was not ignored by
Geller as he utilized the heat pump to illustrate cost and
efficiency relationships. [Ref. 23:pg. 143]
The major gain in electric water heating efficiency was
made possible by the development of the heat pump water
heater (HPWH) . This device functions like a
refrigerator or air conditioner, using a compressor to
move heat from a cooler to a warmer region.
Heat pump water heaters made a significant difference in
energy consumption and saving figures. [Ref.23:pg 14 3]
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Based on field tests in Madison, WI, the top-rated HPWH
consumes only about 35% as much electricity as the
standard electric water heater of late 1970' s.
Higher energy efficiency features, such as the heat pump,
caused the initial cost of newer appliances to be an estimated
four to five times higher than regular water heaters. Table
V shows the representative gains in efficiency in relation to
increased first costs, simple payback period and return on
investment. [Ref. 23:pg. 168]
TABLE V
REPRESENTATIVE GAINS
INCREASE IN INCREASE IN SIMPLE REAL
PRODUCT MODEL EFF FM STND FIRST COST PAYBACK RETURN
FM STD YRS
Gas Wh Amana 73% $350 7.1 17%
Elec HPWH Dec 182% $1200 7.1 12%
These illustrative models were the top of the line at the
time and thus, according to Geller, reflect the worst case
scenarios for longer payback and higher first costs to the
individual consumer. The calculations incorporated average
national energy prices and DOE forecasted energy demand
figures along with average household usage. (Geller, 1986)
Geller published a comprehensive update to his 198 3 study
in 1986. [Ref. 22:pp. 1-13] To illustrate the national scope
of his study Tables VI thru Table X are shown. [Ref. 22:App]
They reflect energy savings and economic savings for hot water
heaters. Also included is Geller' s comparative analysis of
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energy and economic savings between 8 of the thirteen home
appliances affected by standards.
Assumptions used in the analysis include:
1) The analysis considers energy use, first cost, and
operating costs of products sold between 1986 and
2000.
2) The analysis includes the energy and dollar savings
over the lifetime of products affected by standards
sold by the year 2000.
3) The economic analysis is done in terms of constant
1985 dollars using a 5% real discount rate for
equipment and energy costs in the future.
4) The extra first cost for more energy-efficient
models is estimated based on constant cost increase
per unit of energy savings.
5) Average residential energy prices in 1985,
$0.078/kwh for electricity and $6.06/MBtu for
natural gas, are used. Also, it is assumed that
prices remain level in constant dollars; i.e., prices
do not rise faster (or slower) than inflation.
Factors specific to water heaters in the Tables included:
1) The water heater UEC values are based on a constant
hot water demand of 4 3 gal/day for an average
household (2.7 persons).
2) It is assumed that the shipment-weighted energy
factor (EF) ratings in 1984 were 0.494 for GWHs and
0.836 for EWHs.
3) In the marketplace case, it is assumed that the
average new product efficiency experienced during
the 1978-1984 period continue in the future. The
rates of increase are 0.4%/yr for GWHs and 0.6%/yr
for EWHs.
4) In the standards case, it is assumed that the
average new model is 5% more efficient than the
minimum level the year that standards go into effect
(1990) .
5) The extra first cost for increasing the efficiency
of water heaters is derived from the engineering
analysis sponsored by DOE when it considered
standards during the early 1980s. Increasing the
38
efficiency of EWHs is assumed to cost $3.70 per unit
of EF or $0.09 per kwh/yr of savings. Increasing the
efficiency of GWHs is assumed to cost $2.70 per unit
of EF or $6.56 per MBtu/yr of savings.
6) Water heaters have a 13 year lifetime.
7) Water heaters have a peak-to-average load factor of
1.08.
8) Net savings are the savings in lifetime operating
costs minus the estimated extra first cost as a
result of imposing the efficiency standards.
9) The benefit-cost ratio is the value of lifetime
savings divided by the extra first cost for
consumers.
According to Geller's data, Electric water heaters offer
the greatest energy savings, about 39% by the year 2000.
Electric water heaters also provide the most economic net
savings, 31% of the total, while Gas water heaters are second
with 22% of the total. [Ref. 24:pg. 117] While these figures
reflect great estimated savings, due to the substitution
effect discussed in Chapter II, they will in fact probably be
lower.
The resultant benefit-cost ratio is the highest for water
heaters. Any amount over 1.0 would indicate that the benefits
outweigh the costs. Electric and gas water heaters appear to
offer the greatest net benefit with benefit to cost ratios of
8.14 and 8.67 respectively. Other appliances such as air
conditioners and furnaces are closer to 1.0. If savings are
overestimated due to the substitution effect and consumer
welfare losses are factored in, the costs could outweigh the
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Conversely, Geller does raise an interesting argument on
manufacturing costs. By eliminating low efficiency, low cost
products, the company should eventually profit from higher
margin sales on higher cost products. This could reduce
estimated costs to the manufacturer and offset the additional
costs of standard compliance.
Geller' s work does provide the best attempt of the three
studies to balance costs and benefits. He incorporates DOE
cost data and utilizes a reasonable discount rate of 5% to
adjust future costs and benefits. He also recognizes the
limitations of his study. [Ref. 24:pg. 117]
Since the energy and economic savings analysis depends
on assumptions regarding manufacturer and purchaser
behavior in the future in both the marketplace and
standards scenarios, the analysis is inherently
uncertain. . . . However, with stagnant energy prices
now and in the near future, efficiency improvements in
the marketplace may be less than recent trends and
near-term expectations.
Geller 's work, like other studies, does not provide
economic justification for any specific standard efficiency
level. Instead, technically feasible efficiency levels are
assumed based on State and trade standards. In view of the
uncertainties with regard to consumer behavior and unaddressed
consumer welfare costs, the benefit-cost ratios would indicate
that standards are set too strict. In the case of water
heaters, benefit-cost ratios in excess of eight prove the
point.
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However, taking into account the political and national
influences, the sheer magnitude of the savings are impossible
to ignore. Tables VI thru XII provide ample data to logically
support his argument that Federally mandated energy
efficiency standards are necessary in the market for home
appliances.
Consumer welfare loss and the effect of energy efficiency
standards on the market for hot water heaters will be the
focus of the next chapter.
47
IV. EFFECTS ON MARKET FOR HOME APPLIANCES
A. INTRODUCTION
What effect do Federal energy efficiency standards have on
the market for home appliances and more specifically the
market for hot water heaters? Is the free market for home
appliances efficient or inefficient? To answer these
questions and discuss consumer welfare loss, two recent
studies will be utilized. First, a 1987 research report by
Henry Ruderman, Mark D. Levine and James E. McMahon, entitled
The Behavior of the Market for Energy Efficiency in
Residential Appliances Including Heating and Cooling
Equipment , will be analyzed. Then, The Incidence of Welfare
Losses Due to Appliance Efficiency Standards , a paper by Mark
F. Morss, will be examined. Although the two studies differ
in assumptions of free market efficiency, they are critical in
pointing out factors which are key to economic evaluation of
Federally mandated energy efficiency standards. Moreover,
they identify unresolved factors that require further
research.
B. THE MARKET FOR HOME APPLIANCES IS INEFFICIENT
Ruderman et al., examined the behavior of the market for
home appliances over a period from 1972-1982. The study
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compared improvements in appliance energy efficiency to costs,
expecting to find a positive correlation between the two.
[Ref. 25:pg. 101]
To the extent that the market place is effectively
influencing the purchase of energy-efficient household
appliances, there is little need for Federal policies
to modify market forces. To the extent that the market
for energy efficiency is not performing effectively, a
justification for policy intervention can be supported.
From their results they concluded that the market placed
less value on energy savings then desired. This assumes that
maximum energy savings at the minimum price is the desired
goal
.
Key to their approach was analysis based on the aggregate
discount rate. [Ref. 25:pg. 103]
The aggregate discount rate quantifies the behavior of
the market as a whole: the manufacturers of appliances,
the wholesalers and retailers who distribute them, the
third-party appliance installers such as builders or
plumbers, and the individual purchasers.
The study assumed that all parties would optimize their
efficiency choices. By treating the market as a sum of the
optimized choices, a comparison to average consumer discount
rates could be done. If the consumer and market discount
rates varied significantly this would indicate market
inefficiency and conversely, similar rates would back the case
for an efficient home appliance market. The strength of this
approach is that short term fluctuations in price or demand
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would be averaged out in the long run using the aggregate
market discount rate. [Ref. 25:pg. Ill]
Other assumptions used in the study included:
1) Stabilized average fuel costs
2) Non-inclusion of heat pumps in appliance efficiency
design options
3) Excluded maintenance costs for appliances
Fuel prices were averaged based on 1972-1982 DOE data and
converted into 1980 dollars for usage in the study. The
exclusion of heat pumps as an efficiency design option stemmed
from using data from the DOE Engineering Analysis Document
examined in Chapter III. Maintenance costs were assumed to be
small although no data was available to confirm this
assumption.
Tables XIII and XIV show the results of their work.
TABLE XIII
AGGREAGATE MARKET DISCOUNT RATES FOR APPLIANCES,
1972-1980 (based on ADL cost-efficiency curves)
Appliance 1972 1978 1980
Gas central space heater 39 51 56
Oil central sapce heater 52 78 127
Room air conditioner 20 22 19
Central air conditioner 19 25 18
Electric water heater 587 825 816
Gas water heater 91 146 166
Refrigerator 105 96 78
Freezer 379 307 270
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TABLE XIV
PAYBACK PERIOD IN YEARS FOR APPLIANCES,
1972-1980 (based on AdL cost-efficiency curves)
Appliance 1972 1978 1980
Gas central space heater 2.98 2.38 2.21
Oil central sapce heater 2.33 1.70 1.18
Room air conditioner 5.11 4.77 5.25
Central air conditioner 4.96 4.16 5.18
Electric water heater 0.48 0.41 0.41
Gas water heater 1.50 1.07 0.98
Refrigerator 1.35 1.45 1.69
Freezer 0.60 0.67 0.72
These discount rates were calculated for each appliance
based on a single-cost efficiency curve for the period 1972-
1980. They are presented in a percent per year basis.
Ruderman et al conducted sensitivity analysis with regard
to changes in energy price and its effect on the discount
rate. The discount rate is most sensitive to changes in (EF)
with uncertainty levels estimated at 5% or less. [Ref. 25:pg.
114-115] No provision was made for escalating energy rates.
Higher energy rates would increase discount rate percentages.
A cross check with historical data confirmed the general
trends shown in Tables XIII and XIV.
Ruderman, Levine and McMahon observed that discount rates
were high and that payback periods for most appliances were
two years or less. Water heaters had especially high market
discount rates compared to other appliances. This would tend
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to indicate consumers indifference to more efficient water
heaters if purchase costs increased. [Ref. 25:pg. 104]
Because the discount rates of consumers are not known,
they must be inferred from the behavior of the market.
A high discount rate implies that the operating costs
are weighted less heavily because their present value
is less. Thus a consumer with a high discount rate
would prefer a cheaper, less efficient product to an
expensive more efficient one.
This assumption should be tempered with the inclusion of
other factors such as manufacturers, and government and
industry action which could effect the market.
The high discount rates shown in Tables XIII and XIV could
be attributed to lags in market product and price adjustment.
Long lead times would tend to exacerbate this problem,
although the authors contend that discount rates would still
be high. [Ref. 25:pg. 116]
For those appliances with aggregate discount rates
higher than 100 (water heaters) , efficiency measures
that pay for themselves in less than one year were not
in the average product purchased in 1980.
While the energy efficiency factors (EF) associated with
water heaters improved over the period from 1972-1982, it was
not enough to positively effect the market for hot water
heaters to the degree that standardization was required.
Based on the data they compiled, Ruderman, Levine and
McMahon concluded that the market for home appliances was not
performing efficiently and cited the following possible
reasons: [Ref. 25:pg. 116-117]
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1) Lack of information about cost and benefits of
energy efficiency.
2) Difficulty in obtaining the additional capital to
purchase more expensive energy efficient
equipment.
3) Expected savings too small to be of interest to
the purchaser.
4) Prevalence of third party purchasers.
5) The loading of highly efficient equipment with
other features or a scarcity of highly efficient
equipment.
6) Long manufacturing lead times.
7) Marketing strategies that may discourage the
purchase of more efficient products.
The seven reasons cited prevented the free market from
performing efficiently in balancing desired efficiency levels
with desired costs.
With rising energy demand and costs, an efficient market
for home appliances would have reflected these inputs in the
form of more energy efficient products at higher costs without
government regulation. This apparently was not the case as
shown by the study. [Ref. 25:pg. 121]
This work indicates that the behavior of the market for
energy efficiency has been relatively unchanged from
1972-1980 in spite of large changes in energy awareness
and the rapid rise in residential energy prices over
this period.
Ruderman, Levine, and McMahon's study objectively
disagreed with the assumption that the free market for home
appliances was efficient. They made a logical case for
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governmental establishment of minimum quality or performance
standards as a method of ensuring the economical utilization
or consumption of a scarce resource-energy.
C. THE MARKET FOR HOME APPLIANCES IS EFFICIENT
If the market for home appliances were efficient, then
Federal intervention would not be necessary. Free market
forces would theoretically respond to consumer demand for more
efficient home appliances. The rising price of energy should
be matched by the availability of higher energy efficient
products thus optimizing consumer tradeoffs.
In his paper entitled, The Incidence of Welfare Losses Due
to Appliance Efficiency Standards , Mark F. Morss supports the
view that the market for home appliances is efficient. In
arriving at this conclusion, he refutes Ruderman's position
based on several points.
First, he argues that Ruderman's analysis was based on
data that reflected quantity adjustments but not price
adjustments that could have provided market equilibrium. [Ref
.
26:pg. 112]
They assume that variable quantities of appliances of
given efficiency could have been supplied at constant
prices. However, if the short-run marginal costs of
appliances were increasing, then price adjustments as
well as quantity adjustments looked for by Ruderman et
al. Would have equilibrated the 1972-1982 appliance
markets.
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This criticism of pricing assumptions is supported by
Geller's analysis highlighted in Chapter III. [Ref. 23:pg.
149] Usage of DOE incremental pricing data was also
criticized by GAO in their analysis of the DOE s Engineering
Analysis Document. [Ref. 4:pg. 160]
Second, Morss argued that energy suppliers have incentives
to provide energy data to consumers that would help them
optimize energy efficiency choices. Conservation of energy
through energy efficiency would lower demand for new power
plant construction and aid in energy demand forecasting. This
would overcome Ruderman ' s position that appliance markets were
inefficient based on a lack of information. While utility
companies have incentives to provide information that would
assist consumers in efficient energy consumption, they do not
yet provide an itemized breakdown of energy usage by appliance
in the monthly utility bill.
Further, existing consumer education programs, such as the
EnergyGuide appliance labeling program and rebate programs
have had limited success in effectively providing efficiency
information to consumers. [Ref. 27: pp. 1-7]
Finally, Morss argues that in the short-run it is in the
landlord or contractor's best interest to provide more
efficient appliances. He argues that landlords and
contractors are using energy efficiency as a marketing tool to
compete against one another. This opposes Ruderman 's position
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that indirect purchase decisions or third party purchasers
contribute to market inefficiency.
As shown in Chapter II, third party consumers do not have
incentives to purchase higher efficiency appliances. Purchase
cost or first cost is the relevant cost consideration that
effects their profit margin. In the case of upgrading an old
water heater to the latest heat pump model, Geller estimated
an additional increase in purchase cost of $1200. (See Table
V) Is it rational to think that a landlord or contractor, who
is not paying the monthly bills, will go for such a deal?
Based on the discussion of Ruderman et al. and Morss s
work, it appears that the market for home appliances and more
specifically the market for hot water heaters has been
inefficient. Ruderman* s data reflects low increases in
efficiency during periods of high energy rate escalation. From
an economic perspective the market did not appear to adjust to
a new standard of efficiency.
The arguments raised by Ruderman et al., such as lack of
consumer information and prevalence of third party purchasers
are rational and reflect the commonly held perception of
environmental, utility, Congressional and industry standard
proponents that Federal standards are necessary to help the
market seek equilibrium at a desired efficiency versus cost
level. They are also consistent with economic theory
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describing a need for governmental regulation in the face of
market failure. [Ref. l:pp. 71-80]
D. EFFECTS OF STANDARDS ON THE MARKET FOR APPLIANCES
The effect energy efficiency standards would have on the
market for home appliances appears to be significant. Because
standards are to be implemented slowly over a varied lead-in
period, dependant on the product, the quantifiable effects of
standards on the market for home appliances are unknown. For
example, in the case of water heaters, full implementation of
standards occurred in January of 1990. It is too soon for
reliable historical data to be available for analysis. It is
difficult to segregate industry data between costs associated
with standards and those industry would have incurred to be
competitive in the appliance market. When industry data is
available, energy price, energy demand, and manufacturer's
costs would provide interesting comparisons to the forecasted
costs and benefits assumed in the creation of standards.
The implementation of energy efficiency standards can
effect the market in several ways. Third party consumers will
be forced to use higher efficiency appliances, saving energy,
although it is hard to estimate at what magnitude due to
consumer behavior factors outlined in Chapter II.
Manufacturers could benefit from elimination of lower
efficiency, lower profit margin product lines and concentrate
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on higher efficiency product lines. The increase in costs
related to design option efficiency improvements would likely
be passed on to the consumer maintaining desired profit
margins. Manufacturers would also benefit from economies of
scale as they no longer have to produce the range of product
lines to meet varied State standards.
Lower income consumers will bear the brunt of the impact
of standards. Higher purchase costs with resultant longer
payback periods would effect consumers with the lowest energy
demand. This low energy demand results from consumer budget
constraints. High purchase cost would also discourage
replacement of older inefficient appliances.
In his paper, Morss points out that consumer welfare loss
is a cost associated with standards. Welfare costs are a cost
which were not included in the economic evaluation of standard
implementation. [Ref. 27:pg. Ill]
It is shown that the households most likely to prefer
less efficient appliances, and therefore to suffer
welfare losses when standards are imposed, are those
with low levels of appliance usage.
Here the purchase costs are high to a portion of the
population that proportionately uses lower amounts of energy
due to budget constraints.
Morss goes on to point out an example of how standards
would effect water heater purchase decisions. [Ref. 27:pg.
115]
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It is intuitive that a household using a great deal of
hot water would choose a more efficient water heater
than a household using little hot water, since the
latter household has less to gain from purchasing
increased efficiency.
This suggests that an unknown proportion of low income
consumers would optimize their choice with regards to energy
efficiency by purchasing less efficient water heaters. Low
income consumers would appear to have a much higher discount
rate than the market rate. Budget constraints and perceived
return on purchase costs are overriding factors that the low
income consumer would consider in optimizing his/her
efficiency choices.
The magnitude of costs levied via higher first costs on
lower income/low energy consumers is unknown. Welfare costs
could adversely impact benefit-cost ratios especially in the
case of air-conditioning whose B/C ratio was already close to
1.0.
Several factors that are key to analyzing the market for
home appliances remain ambiguous. Consumer welfare costs and
consumer behavior, (as outlined in Chapter II) , contribute to
uncertainty in assumptions concerning market behavior.
Further study in these areas is needed. This, coupled with
research into what operating savings levels would be
attractive to consumers, would go a long way to removing the
ambiguity from assumptions about the market for home
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appliances. The real costs and benefits could then be
ascertained.
Next, Chapter V will focus on enforcement procedures and
the costs associated with certification and testing programs.
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V. CERTIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
How are energy efficiency standards enforced and what are
the costs involved? To answer this question, the National
Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987 and the Consumer
Products Efficiency Standards Engineering Analysis Document
were utilized. These two documents highlight the policy and
procedural guidance for the DOE ' s certification and
enforcement program. Additionally, they estimate the
associated costs that would be incurred in the certification
and enforcement of energy efficiency standards in home
appliances.
B. CERTIFICATION
Products are divided into two separate groups in the
certification process - low production volume models and basic
models. In the case of water heaters, low production volume
is production levels of 250 or less per year. Low production
volume models are deemed compliant to energy efficiency
standards if each unit equals or exceeds 95% of the applicable
standard. Basic models were to be certified in accordance
with established Federal Trade Commission guidelines for
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testing and sampling as outlined in 10 CFR Part 430 Subpart B
(FTC Sampling Plan) . [Ref . 19:pg. F-2]
By establishing a two-tiered testing and certification
program, DOE helped reduce certification costs to the small
manufacturer. This was a response to the small manufacturer's
complaints that large scale certification and testing
procedures would put small manufacturers out of business.
[Ref. 19:pg. F-13]
Certification testing was also said to unduly increase
the costs of basic models with low production volumes.
For example, certification test costs that represent 1%
percent of the factory value of a basic model with an
annual production of 1,000 units would represent 20% of
the factory value of a basic model with an annual
production of only 50 units.
The result was that small manufacturers would need to test
one half of the average estimated sample size for testing
under FTC guidelines. [Ref. 19:pg. F-14] This helped to
equate the certification and testing costs between large and
small manufacturers on a per unit basis.
C . ENFORCEMENT
DOE enforcement policy relies on market queuing to
identify non-complying manufacturers. An elaborate national
network of enforcement agencies and inspectors was deemed too
costly. Instead, DOE relies on sources of information such as
the FTC labeling program, industry testing programs, consumers
and the manufacturers themselves. [Ref. 19:pg. F-16]
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If DOE has indications that a specific model may not be in
compliance with the applicable energy efficiency standard, a
notice is sent to the manufacturer outlining the model to be
tested, the method for selecting a test sample and the
facility that will be utilized for testing the model. (Ref.
19:pg. F-8) The DOE inspector then selects a batch of up to
22 units from the sample. Individual test units are then
randomly sampled for compliance to the rated energy efficiency
standard for the product. [Ref. 19:pg. F-8]
22 is selected as the batch number under the assumption
that this provides adequate provision for test unit
failures while giving the manufacturer a known max
value for the number of units to be retained in the
batch sample.
Under DOE guidelines, distribution would cease immediately
if products were found in non-compliance with standards. The
manufacturer would have to re-certify the product before
distribution could begin again. A fine of no more than $100
per unit could be assessed on the manufacturer who knowingly
produces appliances not in compliance with the energy
efficiency standards. [Ref. 20:pg. 47] A DOE commission
would assess the penalty via written notice to the
manufacturer. DOE estimated that enforcement testing would be
conducted on less than 1% of the covered basic models in any
year. [Ref. 19:pg. F-16]
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D. COSTS
The costs associated with standard certification testing
and enforcement are split between the industry and DOE.
Generally, certification costs are borne by the manufacturers
while enforcement costs are assumed by DOE. This parallels
where the product is tested, with most certification testing
occurring at the manufacturer's facilities and most
enforcement testing occurring at independent test laboratories
selected by DOE. [Ref. 19:pg. F-30]
Table XV shows the estimated annual FTC and DOE
certification and enforcement costs to the manufacturers.
TABLE XV
ANNUAL FTC AND DOE CERTIFICATION


















DOE C/E COSTS $410 0.073 0.072
SOURCE DOE/CE-0030
These certification and enforcement costs vary from the 11
cents per unit C/E cost assigned to manufacturers costs in
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Chapter III. This can be explained by revisions in DOE's
approach to the C/E program. In DOE's Consumer Products
Efficiency Standards Analysis Document, the certification and
enforcement program required more documentation and monitoring
of manufacturers then the revised C/E program. Existing
manufacturer's costs associated with FTC compliance were
assumed to be unchanged.
The total additional costs of the DOE C/E program to the
home appliance industry would be in excess of $231,000
dollars. This is in excess of existing FTC testing costs.
Water heater manufacturers would assume $17,000 of this total.
Water heater manufacturers appear to be less sensitive to C/E
initiatives when compared to other home appliances. Central
air conditioners and Furnaces account for the remaining
$214,000.
Overall, the DOE's C/E program, as outlined by the
National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987 and the
Consumer Products Efficiency Standards Engineering Analysis
Document, does not appear to significantly impact the hot
water heater manufacturer. This assumption is consistent with
DOE's approach to utilizing existing FTC product testing
programs and voluntary manufacturer product testing to keep
certification and enforcement costs down.
Additionally, by not setting up a regional or state C/E
apparatus, the DOE saves dollars. This program would appear
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to rely heavily on the industry, state energy conservation
offices, consumers and local building code inspectors to help
identify non-compliant products.
The decision to implement a C/E program was predicated by
the assumed passage of the energy efficiency standards.
Whether the costs of C/E outweigh the benefits is therefore a
moot point. It does appear that DOE approached the issue of





This study has explored the economic evaluation process
associated with the establishment of national energy
efficiency standards for home appliances. Hot water heaters,
one of the 13 home appliances effected by standards, provided
a representative analysis point to assess the effects of
government regulation on a free market. Testimony of key
proponents and opponents of standards, along with
comprehensive studies and articles on energy efficiency,
provided a framework for analysis.
B. CONCLUSIONS
While it is hard to separate economic arguments from
political and technical influences, this study has sought to
identify economic factors that effected product design choice.
Although assumptions concerning cost and savings projections
vary, the magnitude of energy savings possible are too large
to question. Energy conservation arguments bring a national
scope to the problem of standard implementation. This appears
to be a rare case in which the regulated (home appliance
industry) wished to be regulated by a reluctant Federal
government. Normal free market resistance to Federal
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regulation was not readily apparent due to State energy
efficiency standard development. It was better for the
industry to have one standard then many State standards.
Based on representative data highlighted in this study, it
appears that the market for home appliances was inefficient.
Classic economic indicators of market failure, such as
information failure and externalities, would then appear to
justify the need for federal intervention in the free market
for home appliances.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Analysis has identified several areas that need further
study. First, consumer welfare costs remain an unknown
factor, not quantified in the representative studies examined.
These costs could be significant in that low income consumers
bear a proportionately higher share of the cost of
standardization while theoretically consuming less of the
"saved" energy. Second, consumer behavior with regard to
energy efficiency optimization, remains an uncertainty that
could impact cost and savings assumptions. For instance, what
level of operating savings would the consumer require to
overcome a higher level of purchase costs? The answer to this
question would be essential to any justification of standard
setting. Perhaps there is not a quantifiable answer to this
and other predictions of consumer behavior. Until these two
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issues are addressed, further analysis of the balance of costs
and benefits associated with energy efficiency will be based
on varied and sometimes questionable assumptions.
Additionally, further study could concentrate on the
question of whether standards are the best method for
government intervention in the home appliance market.
Alternatives, such as taxes, subsidies and incentive programs
merit evaluation. Perhaps these alternatives could be more
cost effective or save higher levels of energy without
restricting the home appliance industry.
The question that still remains unanswered is what level
of energy efficiency is optimal? Political and technical
influences can be factors in this answer. Economically the
efficiency level that equates to a balancing of marginal costs
and marginal benefits would approximate the appropriate
energy efficiency level. Perhaps then, and in isolation of
political and technical influences, could a economically
justifiable standard be set.
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